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a b s t r a c t
In this paper we study the support sizes of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) in random
evolutionary games. We prove that, when the elements of the payoff matrix behave either
as uniform, or normally distributed random variables, almost all ESS have support sizes
o (n), where n is the number of possible types for a player. Our arguments are based
exclusively on a stability property that the payoff submatrix indicated by the support of
an ESS must satisfy.
We then combine this result with a recent result of McLennan and Berg [A. McLennan,
J. Berg, The asymptotic expected number of nash equilibria of two player normal form
games, Games and Economic Behavior 51 (2005) 264–295], concerning the expected
number of Nash Equilibria in normal-random bimatrix games, to show that the expected
number of ESS is significantly smaller than the expected number of symmetric Nash
equilibria of the underlying symmetric bimatrix game.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Game theory is the study of interactive decision making, in the sense that those involved in the decisions are affected not
only by their own choices, but also by the decisions of others.
This study is guided by two principles: (1) The choices of players are affected by well-defined (and not changing)
preferences over outcomes of decisions. (2) Players act strategically, i.e. they take into account the interaction between their
choices and the ways other players act.
The dominant convention of traditional game theory is the assumption that players are rational and this rationality is
common knowledge. This common knowledge of rationality gives hope to equilibrium play: Players use their equilibrium
strategies because of what would happen had they not.
The point of departure for evolutionary game theory is the view that the players are not always rational, due to either
limited knowledge, or even computational limitations. In evolutionary games, ‘‘good’’ strategies rather emerge from a trial-
and-error learning process, in which players discover that some strategies perform better than others, or decide to play in a
different way in hope of getting a better payoff. The players may do very little reasoning during this process. Instead, they
simply take actions by rules of thumb, social norms, analogies for similar situations, or by other (possibly more complex)
methods for converting stimuli into actions.
Thus, in evolutionary games we may say that the players are ‘‘programmed’’ to adopt some strategies. Typically, the
evolution process deals with an infinite population of players. As time proceeds, many small games are conducted (e.g.
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among pairs of players that ‘‘happen’’ to meet). One then expects that strategies with higher payoffs will spread within the
population (by learning, copying successful strategies, or even by infection).
Indeed, evolutionary games in large populations of players create a dynamic process, where the frequencies of the
strategies played (by population members) change with time because of the learning or selection forces guiding the players’
choices. Clearly, the rate of changes depends on the current strategy mix in the population. Such dynamics can be described
by stochastic or deterministic models. The subject of evolutionary game theory is exactly the study of these dynamics. An
excellent presentation of the evolutionary game dynamics can be found in [6]. For a more thorough study the reader is
referred to [1].
Not surprisingly, evolutionary game processes that converge to stable states have usually the property that those states
are also self-confirming equilibria (e.g. Nash equilibria), as we shall see later. In fact, one of themain approaches in the study
of evolutionary games is the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS), which are nothing more than Nash Equilibria
togetherwith an additional stability property. This additional property is interpreted as ensuring that if an ESS is established
in a population, and if a small proportion of the population adopts somemutant behavior, then the process of selection (or
learning) will eliminate the latter. Once an ESS is established in a population, it should therefore be able to withstand the
pressures of mutation and selection.
It should be obvious by the above discussion that evolutionary game theory is a very suitable framework for the study of
self-organization. The framework draws on the rich tradition of game theory. It is mathematically precise and rigorous; it is
general enough to be applied in many example areas such as biology and species evolution, infection and spread of viruses
in living populations or in the Internet, self-stabilization codes in distributed computing, etc. We would like to especially
stress the suitability of such a theory for the study of self-stabilizing distributed protocols (e.g. Dijkstra). It is our belief that
ESS is the right concept.
1.1. Related work
In this work we study the distribution of the support sizes of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) in random evolutionary
games, i.e. whose payoff matrices have elements that behave as independent, identically distributed random variables.
The concept of ESS was formally introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [14]. Haigh [4] provided an alternative
characterization, via a set of necessary and sufficient conditions (called feasibility, superiority and stability conditions), for
a strategy x being an ESS. As will be clear later, the first two conditions imply that the profile (x, x) is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium (SNE) of the underlying symmetric bimatrix game 〈A, AT〉.
A series of works about thirty years ago (Gillespie, [3], Lewontin et al. [9] and Karlin [7]) have investigated the probability
that an evolutionary game with an n× n payoff Awhose elements behave as uniform random variables in [0, 1], possesses
a completely mixed strategy (i.e. assigning positive probability to all possible types) which is an ESS. Karlin [7] had already
reported experimental evidence that the stability condition is far more restrictive than the feasibility condition in this case
with respect to the existence of ESS (the superiority condition becomes vague in this case sincewe refer to completelymixed
strategies).
Kingman [8] also worked on the severity of the stability condition, in a work on the size of polymorphisms which,
interpreted in random evolutionary games, corresponds to random payoff matrices that are symmetric. For the case of
uniform distribution, he proved that almost all ESS in a random evolutionary game with a symmetric payoff matrix, have
support size less than 2.49
√
n. Consequently, Haigh [5] extended this result to the case of asymmetric random payoff
matrices. Namely, for a particular probability measure with density φ(x) = exp(−x)/√pix, he proved that almost all ESS
have support size at most 1.636n2/3. He also conjectured that similar results should also hold for a wide range of probability
measures with continuous density functions.
Another (more recent) line of research concerns the expected number of Nash equilibria in random bimatrix games.
Initially McLennan [10] studied this quantity for arbitrary normal form games and provided a formula for this number.
Consequently, McLennan and Berg [11] computed asymptotically tight bounds for this formula, for the special case of
bimatrix games. They proved that the expected number of NE in normal-random bimatrix games is asymptotically equal
to exp(0.2816n+ O(log n)), while almost all NE have support sizes that concentrate around 0.316n. Recently Roberts [13]
calculated this number in the cases of zero sum games 〈A,−A〉 and coordination games 〈A, A〉, when the Cauchy probability
measure is used for the entries of the payoff matrix A.
1.2. Our contribution
In this work we resolve affirmatively the conjecture of Haigh for the cases of the uniform distribution in [0, 1] and the
standard normal distribution (actually, shifted by a positive number).We then proceed to combine our result on satisfaction
of the stability condition in randomevolutionary gameswith respect to (wrt in short) the (standard, shifted) normal distribu-
tion,with the result ofMcLennan and Berg [11] on the expected number of NE in normal-randombimatrix games. Our obser-
vation is that ESS in random evolutionary games are significantly less than SNE in the underlying symmetric bimatrix games.
The structure of the rest of the paper is the following: In Section 2 we provide some notation and some elementary
background on (symmetric) bimatrix and evolutionary games. In Section 3 we calculate the probability of the stability
condition holding (unconditionally) for given support sizes, in the case of the uniformdistribution (cf. Section 3.2) and in the
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case of the normal distribution (cf. Section 3.3). We then use these bounds to give concentration results on the support sizes
of ESS for these two random models of evolutionary games (cf. Section 3.4). Finally, in Section 4 we prove that the stability
condition is more severe than the (symmetric) Nash property in symmetric games, by showing that the expected number
of ESS in an evolutionary game with a normal-random payoff matrix A is significantly less than the expected number of
Symmetric Nash Equilibria in the underlying symmetric bimatrix game 〈A, AT〉.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
R denotes the set of real numbers, R>0 is the set of nonnegative reals, and N is the set of nonnegative integer numbers.
For any k ∈ N \ {0}, we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k} by [k]. ei ∈ Rn is the vector with all its elements equal to zero, except
for its ith element, which is equal to one. 1 =∑i∈[n] ei is the all-one vector, while 0 is the all-zero vector in Rn.
We consider any n×1matrix as a column vector and any 1×nmatrix as a row vector ofRn. A vector is denoted by small
boldface letters (e.g. x, p, . . .) and is typically considered as a column vector.
For any m × n real matrix A ∈ Rm×n, its ith row (as a row vector) is denoted by Ai, whereas its jth column (as a column
vector) is denoted by Aj. The (i, j)th element of A is denoted by Ai,j (or, Aij). AT is the transpose matrix of A.
For any probability space (Ω,F , P) and any event E ∈ F , we denote by P {E} the probability of this event occurring,
while I{E} is the indicator variable of E holding. For a random variable X , we denote by E {X} its expectation and Var {X}
its variance. In order to denote that a random variable X gets its value according to a probability distribution F , we use the
following notation: X ∈R F . For example, for a uniform random variable in [0, 1]we write X ∈R U(0, 1), while for a random
variable drawn from the standard normal distribution we write X ∈R N (0, 1).
For any positive integer k ∈ N, ∆k ≡ {z ∈ Rk>0 : 1Tz = 1} is the (k − 1)-simplex, i.e. the set of probability vectors
over k-element sets. For any z ∈ ∆k, its support is the subset of [k] of actions that are assigned positive probability mass:
supp(z) ≡ {i ∈ [k] : zi > 0}.
2.2. Bimatrix games
The subclass of symmetric bimatrix games provides the basic setting for much of Evolutionary Game Theory. Indeed,
every evolutionary game implies an underlying symmetric bimatrix game, that is repeatedly played between randomly
chosen opponents from the population. Thereforewe provide themain game theoretic definitionswith respect to symmetric
bimatrix games.
Definition 1. For arbitrary m × n real matrices A, B ∈ Rm×n, the bimatrix game Γ = 〈A, B〉 is a game in strategic form
between two players, in which the first (row) player has m possible actions and the second (column) player has n possible
actions. The payoffs of the row and the column player, when the row player adopts action i and the column player adopts
action j, are Aij and Bij respectively. If the two players adopt mixed strategies p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆n, then the row player gets
an expected payoff pTAq and the column player gets an expected payoff pTBq. Some special cases of bimatrix games are the
zero sum games (where B = −A), the coordination games (where B = A) and the symmetric games (where B = AT).
Note that in the case of a symmetric bimatrix game, the two players have exactly the same set of possible actions (say, [n]).
Due to their connection to the notion of ESS (to be defined in the next section), we now provide the definition of the Nash
Equilibrium (Nash [12]), which is the standard solution concept in strategic games:
Definition 2. For any bimatrix game 〈A, B〉, a strategy profile (x, y) ∈ ∆m ×∆n is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE in short),
if and only if (xTAy) > zTAy, ∀z ∈ ∆m and (xTBy) > xTBz, ∀z ∈ ∆n. If additionally supp(x) = [m] and supp(y) = [n],
then (x, y) is called a completely mixed Nash Equilibrium (CMNE in short). A profile (x, x) that is NE for 〈A, B〉 is called a
symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE in short).
Observe that the payoff matrices in a symmetric bimatrix game need not be symmetric. Note also that not all NE of a
symmetric bimatrix game need be symmetric. However it is known that there is at least one such equilibrium:
Theorem 1 ([12]). Each finite symmetric bimatrix game has at least one SNE.
Whenwewish to argue about the vastmajority of symmetric bimatrix games, oneway is to assume that the real numbers
in the set {Ai,j : (i, j) ∈ [n]} are independently drawn from a probability distribution F . For example, it can be the uniform
distribution in an interval [a, b] ∈ R, denoted byU(a, b). Then, a random symmetric bimatrix game Γ is just an instance of
the implied random experiment that is described in the following definition.
Definition 3. A symmetric bimatrix game Γ = 〈A, AT〉 is an instance of a (symmetric 2-player) random game wrt the
probability distribution F , if and only if ∀i, j ∈ [n], the real number Ai,j is an independently and identically distributed
random variable drawn from F .
2.3. Evolutionary stable strategies
Fix a symmetric game Γ = 〈A, AT〉 for some A ∈ Rn×n. Suppose that all the individuals of an infinite population are
programmed to play the same (either pure or mixed) incumbent strategy x ∈ ∆n, whenever they are involved in the game
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Γ . Suppose also that at some time a small group of invaders appears in the population. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) be the share of
invaders in the post-entry population. Assume that all the invaders are programmed to play the (pure or mixed) strategy
y ∈ ∆whenever they are involved in Γ .
Pairs of individuals in this dimorphic post-entry population are now repeatedly drawn at random to play always the same
symmetric game Γ against each other. Recall that, due to symmetry, it is exactly the same for each player to be either the
row or the column player. If an individual is chosen to participate, the probability that her (random) opponent will play
strategy x is 1− ε, while that of playing strategy y is ε. This is equivalent to saying that the opponent is an individual who
plays the mixed strategy z = (1 − ε)x + εy. The post-entry payoff to the incumbent strategy x is then xTAz and that of
the invading strategy y is just yTAz. Intuitively, evolutionary forces will select against the invader if xTAz > yTAz. The most
popular notion of stability in evolutionary games is the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS):
Definition 4. A strategy x is evolutionary stable (ESS in short) if for any strategy y 6= x there exists a barrier ε¯ = ε¯(y) ∈
(0, 1) such that ∀0 < ε 6 ε¯, xTAz > yTAzwhere z = (1− ε)x+ εy.
A mixed strategy x ∈ ∆n is completely mixed if and only if supp(x) = [n] (that is, it assigns to all the allowable actions
non-zero probability). The following lemma states that the ‘‘hard cases’’ of evolutionary games are not the ones in which
there exists an ESS that is completely mixed:
Lemma 1 (Haigh [4]). If a completely mixed strategy x ∈ ∆ is an ESS, then it is the unique ESS of the evolutionary game.
Observe that games having a fully mixed ESS, are easy to be checked since the Nash property is checked in polynomial
time, and the stability property is equivalent to negative definiteness of the payoff matrix A. So the games of unknown
tractability (wrt constructing an ESS) are those which do not have completely mixed ESS. Indeed, applying the argument
of Lemma 1 recursively to submatrices of the payoff matrix, it is easy to show that if for an evolutionary game with payoff
matrix A ∈ Rn×n it holds that some strategy x ∈ ∆n is an ESS, then no strategy y ∈ ∆n such that supp(y) ⊆ supp(x) can be
an ESS as well.
Haigh [4] also provided an alternative characterization of ESS in evolutionary games, which is the conjunction of the
following sentences, and will prove to be very useful for our discussion:
Theorem 2 (Haigh [4]). A strategy p ∈ ∆n in an evolutionary game with payoff matrix A ∈ Rn×n is an ESS if and only if the
following conditions simultaneously hold:
[H1]: Nash Property There is a constant c ∈ R such that:
[H1.1]: Feasibility
∑
j∈supp(p) Aijpj = Aip = c, ∀i ∈ supp(p).
[H1.2]: Superiority
∑
j∈supp(p) Aijpj = Aip 6 c, ∀i /∈ supp(p).
[H2]: Stability ∀x ∈ Rn :
IF (x 6= 0 ∧ supp(x) ⊆ supp(p) ∧ 1Tx = 0)
THEN
∑
i,j∈supp(p) xiAijxj = xTAx < 0.
Observe that condition [H1] assures that (p, p) is a symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) of the underlying symmetric bimatrix
game 〈A, AT〉. This is because:
∀i, j ∈ [n], i ∈ supp(p)⇒ Aip > Ajp
∀i, j ∈ [n], i ∈ supp(p)⇒ pT(AT)i = pT(Ai)T > pT(Aj)T = pT(AT)j.
Since in this work we deal with evolutionary games with random payoff matrices (in particular, whose entries behave as
independent, identically distributed continuous random variables), we can safely assume that almost surely [H1.2] holds
with strict inequality. As for condition [H2], this is the one that guarantees the stability of the strategy against (sufficiently
small) invasions. It actually states that any feasible direction of change that reallocates probability mass among types that
already have positive probability mass, may only be harmful to the individuals that would consider adopting it.
3. Probability of stability
In this section we study the probability of a strategy with support size r ∈ [n] also being an ESS. In the next section we
shall use this to calculate an upper bound on the support sizes of almost all ESS in a random game.
Assume a probability distribution F , whose density function φ : R 7→ [0, 1] exists, according to which the random
variables
{
Aij
}
(i,j)∈[n]×[n] determine (independently) their values. We focus in this paper on the case of uniform distribution
U(0, 1), whose density function is φu(x) = I{x∈[0,1]} and distribution function Φu(x) = x · I{x∈[0,1]} + I{x>1}, and the case
of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1), whose density function is φg(x) = exp(−x
2/2)√
2pi
and its distribution function is
Φg(x) =
∫ x
−∞ φg(t)dt .
Our goal is to study the severity of the necessary condition [H2] for a strategy being an ESS. We follow Haigh’s
generalization of the interesting approach of Kingman (for random symmetric payoff matrices) to the case of asymmetric
matrices. Our findings are analogous to those of Haigh [5], who gave the general methodology and then focused on a
particular distribution. Here we resolve the cases of uniform distribution and standard normal distributions, that were left
open in [5].
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3.1. Kingman’s approach
Consider an arbitrary strategy p ∈ ∆n, for whichwe assume (without loss of generality) that its support is supp(p) = [r].
Since condition [H2] has to hold for any non-zero real vector x ∈ Rn \ {0} : 1Tx = 0 ∧ supp(x) ⊆ [r], we can also apply
it for all vectors x(i, j) = ei − ej : 1 6 i < j 6 r , as was observed in [8]. This immediately implies that the following is a
necessary condition for p being an ESS:
∀1 6 i < j 6 r, Aij + Aji > Aii + Ajj. (1)
Mimicking Kingman and Haigh’s notation [8,5], we denote by DI the event that our random matrix A has the property
described by inequality (1), if r = |I| and we rearrange first the rows and columns of A so that I = [r]. As was demonstrated
in [5], the probability of this event is expressed by the following form:
P {DI} =
∫ ∞
−∞
· · ·
∫ ∞
−∞
∏
16i<j6r
[1− G(aii + ajj)] ·
∏
i∈[r]
[φ(aii)] da11 · · · darr (2)
where G(x) = ∫ x−∞ g(t)dt is the probability distribution function of a random variable Xij : 1 6 i < j 6 r that is equal to
the sum Aij + Aji of two iid random variables with density function φ. Note that the density function g is the convolution of
φ with itself. Haigh analyzed this formula for the special case where φ(x) = exp(−x)/√pix.
In the following two subsections we do the same for the uniform and (shifted) standard normal distribution. Then we
continue the argument to bound the support sizes of almost all ESS in uniformly-random and normal-random evolutionary
games.
3.2. The case ofU(0, 1)
If we adopt U(0, 1) as our basic probability distribution, then of course φ(x) = φu(x) = I{x∈(0,1)} and the distribution
function G can be easily computed:
∀0 6 x 6 1, G(x) =
∫ x
0
φ(aii)
(∫ x−aii
0
φ(ajj)dajj
)
daii = x
2
2
∀1 6 x 6 2, G(x) =
∫ 1
0
φ(aii)
(∫ min{1,x−aii}
0
φ(ajj)dajj
)
daii
= 2x− 1− x
2
2
.
Therefore we conclude that the following holds (also mentioned in [5]): ∀x ∈ R,
1− G(x) =
(
1− x
2
2
)
· I{06x61} + 12 (2− x)
2 · I{1<x62}. (3)
Observe now that each 1 − G(aii + ajj) factor in Eq. (2) expresses the probability that the random variable Xij ≡ Aij + Aji
is strictly larger than a certain value aii + ajj. On the other hand, all the φ(aii) = φu(aii) factors in equality (2) assure that
each of the diagonal elements in A (i.e. the random variables Aii) get the assumed values (i.e. Aii = aii), which have to be
nonnegative. We use the following trivial upper bound on each of the 1− G(aii + ajj) factors, which exploits only the fact of
nonnegative values of the elementary random variables Aij ∈R U(0, 1) that we consider: ∀1 6 i < j 6 r ,
1− G(aii + ajj) = P
{
Xij > aii + ajj
}
6 P
{
Xij > aii
} = 1− G(aii)
and get the following upper bound from (2):
P {DI} 6
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
∏
16i<j6r
[1− G(aii)] da11 · · · darr
=
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
∏
16i6r−1
[1− G(aii)]r−i da11 · · · darr
=
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
[ ∏
i∈[r−1]
([1− G(aii)]r−i daii) · ∫ 1
0
darr
]
=
∏
i∈[r−1]
(∫ 1
0
[1− G(aii)]r−i daii
)
(4)
where we exploited the facts that φ(x) = I{x∈(0,1)} and
∫ 1
0 φ(arr)darr = 1.
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Plugging in the exact form of 1− G(x) in the case of the uniform distribution (see Eq. (3)), we get the following:
P {DI} 6
∏
i∈[r−1]
(∫ 1
0
[
1− 1
2
a2ii
]r−i
daii
)
. (5)
Using the trivial bound (1− x)a 6 exp(−ax),∀x > 0,∀a > 1, we have:
P {DI} 6
∏
i∈[r−1]
[∫ 1
0
exp
(
− r − i
2
a2ii
)
daii
]
6
∏
i∈[r−1]
[
1√
r − i ·
∫ 1
0
exp
(
−
(
aii
√
r − i)2
2
) √
r − i daii
]
=
∏
i∈[r−1]
[
1√
r − i ·
∫ √r−i
0
exp
(
−β
2
i
2
)
dβi
]
<
∏
i∈[r−1]
[
1
2
√
r − i
]
= 1
2r−1 · √(r − 1)!
= exp
(
−(r − 1) ln 2− 1
2
r−1∑
j=1
ln j
)
< exp
(
−(r − 1) ln 2− 1
2
[
(r − 1)+
r−1∑
j=1
Hj
])
= exp
(
−(r − 1) ln 2− 1
2
[−2(r − 1)+ rHr−1]
)
= exp
(
(r − 1)(1− ln 2)− r
2
− r
2
ln(r − 1)
)
= exp
(
− r ln r
2
+ O(r)
)
(6)
since,
∫ √r−i
0 exp
(
− β2i2
)
dβi <
∫∞
0 exp
(
− β2i2
)
dβi = 12 . We used also the following properties of harmonic numbers: If
Hr−1 =∑r−1i=1 1i is the (r − 1)th harmonic number, then∑r−1i=1 Hi = rHr−1 − (r − 1) and ln(r − 1) < Hr−1 < ln(r − 1)+ 1.
3.3. The case ofN (ξ , 1)
Assume now, for some ξ > 0 that will be fixed later, that each element of the payoff matrix behaves as a normally
distributed independent random variable with mean ξ and variance 1: ∀(i, j) ∈ [n] × [n], Aij ∈R N (ξ , 1). Then it also holds
that all the Xij variables (for 1 6 i < j 6 r) behave also as normally distributed random variables, withmean 2ξ and variance
2. That is: ∀(i, j) ∈ [r] × [r] : i 6= j, Xij ∈R N (2ξ, 2). Then the following hold:
∀t ∈ R, φ(t) = 1√
2pi
exp
(
− (t − ξ)
2
2
)
g(t) = 1
2
√
pi
exp
(
− (t − 2ξ)
2
4
)
∀x ∈ R, 1− F(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
exp
(
− (t − ξ)
2
2
)
dt
/∗ z=t−ξ ∗/H⇒ 1− F(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x−ξ
exp
(
− z
2
2
)
dz
1− G(x) = 1
2
√
pi
∫ ∞
x
exp
(
− (t − 2ξ)
2
4
)
dt
/∗ z= t−2ξ√
2
∗/
H⇒ 1− G(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x−2ξ√
2
exp
(
− z
2
2
)
dz.
Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 933–942 939
We use the following property that is useful for bounding the cumulative distribution of a normal-random variable:
Proposition 1 (Durrett,Theorem 1.4 [2]).
∀x > 0, (1− x−2) exp(x2/2)
x
6
∫ ∞
x
exp(−z2/2)dz 6 exp(x
2/2)
x
.
For example, exploiting the above fact, the following simple corollary is trivial to prove:
Corollary 1. Assume that F(x),G(x) are the cumulative distribution functions ofN (ξ , 1) andN (2ξ, 2) respectively. Then:
– ∀x > ξ, 1− F(x) ∈
[(
1− 1
(x−ξ)2
)
, 1
]
· 1√
2pi
· exp(−(x−ξ)2/2)x−ξ .
– ∀x > 2ξ, 1− G(x) ∈
[(
1− 2
(x−2ξ)2
)
, 1
]
· 1√
pi
· exp(−(x−2ξ)2/4)x−2ξ .
Recall now that
P {DI} =
∫ ∞
−∞
· · ·
∫ ∞
−∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
r times
∏
16i<j6r
[1− G(aii + ajj)] ·
∏
i∈[r]
(φ(aii)daii)
6
r∑
k=0
(
r
k
) k∏
i=1
(∫ 0
−∞
φ(aii)daii
)
·
r∏
i=k+1
(∫ ∞
0
[1− G(aii)]r−iφ(aii)daii
)
=
r∑
k=0
(
r
k
)
(F(0))k ·
r−k−1∏
i=0
µi
where we have exploited the facts that ∀x ∈ R, 1 − G(x) = P {X > x} 6 1 and ∀y, z > 0, 1 − G(y + z) = P {X > y+ z}
6 P {X > z} = 1− G(z) and we set µi ≡
∫∞
0 [1− G(x)]iφ(x)dx, ∀i ∈ N.
Exploiting Corollary 1 and the symmetry of the normal distribution, we have:
F(0)k = (1− F(2ξ))k 6
(
exp(−ξ 2/2)
ξ · √2pi
)k
= exp
(
−k ln(2pi)
2
− kξ
2
2
− k ln ξ
)
.
As for the product of the µi’s, since ∀i > 0, µi =
∫∞
0 [1− G(x)]iφ(x)dx 6 [1− G(0)]i · (1− F(0)), we conclude that:
r−k−1∏
i=0
µi 6 (1− F(0))r−k · (1− G(0))(r−k)(r−k−1)/2
6 exp
(
−(r − k)F(0)− (r − k)(r − k− 1)
2
· G(0)
)
< exp
(
− (r − k)(r − k− 1)
2
· G(0)
)
.
Therefore we get the following bound:
P {DI} 6 exp
(
− r(r − 1)
2
· G(0)
)
+
r∑
k=1
exp
(
k ln
( r
k
)
− (r − k)(r − k− 1)
2
· G(0)− kξ
2
2
− O(k ln ξ)
)
. (7)
Assume now that, for some sufficiently small δ > 0, it holds that ξ = √(1− δ) ln r . Observe that for some constant ε > 0
and all 0 6 k 6 εr ,
r−k−1∏
i=0
µi < exp
(
− (1− ε)
2
2
r2 · G(0)
)
= exp
(
− (1− ε)
2
2
r ln r · eδ ln r−O(ln ln r)
)
< exp
(
− (1− ε)
2
2
r ln r
)
for δ = Ω( ln ln rln r ), exploiting the fact that G(0) = exp (−ξ 2 − ln ξ − O(1)) (cf. Corollary 1).
940 Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 933–942
On the other hand, for all εr < k 6 r , observe that
F(0)k 6 exp
(
−kξ
2
2
− k ln ξ − O(k)
)
< exp
(
−1− δ
2
εr ln r − O(k ln ln r)
)
< exp
(
− (1− δ)ε
2
r ln r
)
.
Since for ε = 3−
√
5
2 it holds that
(1−ε)2
2 >
(1−δ)ε
2 , we conclude that each term on the right-hand side of inequality (7) is upper
bounded by exp(−ε(1− δ)/2 · r ln r + O(r)) and so we get the following:
P {DI} 6 exp
(
− (1− δ)ε
2
· r ln r + O(r)
)
.
3.4. Support sizes of almost all ESS
In the previous subsections we calculated upper bounds on the probability P {DI} of a size-r subset I ⊂ [n] (say, I = [r])
satisfying [H2] (and thus being a candidate support for an ESS), for the cases of the uniform distribution U(0, 1) and the
normal distributionN
(√
(1− δ) ln r, 1).
We now apply the following counting argument introduced by Kingman and used also by Haigh: Let dr be the event that
there exists a submatrix of the random matrix A, of size at least r × r , such that DI is satisfied. Then the probability of this
event occurring is upper bounded by the following formula (cf. [5][eq. 10]):
∀1 6 s 6 r 6 n, P {dr} = P {∃ submatrix with |I| > r s.t. DI holds}
6
(
n
s
)
· P {Ds} /
(
r
s
)
.
Using Stirling’s formula k! = √2pik · (k/e)k · (1+Θ(1/k)), where e = exp(1), we write: ∀1 6 s 6 r 6 n,(
n
s
)
(
r
s
) = (n
r
)s+1/2 · ( n
n− s
)n−s
·
(
r − s
r
)r−s
·
(
r − s
n− s
)1/2
· (1+ o(1)).
Assume now that r = Ana > s = Bnβ , for some 1 > a > β > 0 and A > B. Then:(
n
s
)
(
r
s
) = (1+ o(1)) · (n1−a
A
)Bnβ+1/2
·
(
1− B
n1−β
)−nβ (n1−β−B)
·
(
1− B
Ana−β
)nβ (Ana−b−B)
·
(
A
n1−a
· 1− B/(An
a−β)
1− B/n1−β
)1/2
= exp ((1− a)Bnβ ln n+ O(nβ)) .
We proved for the uniform distribution U(0, 1) that for any subset I ⊆ [n] such that |I| = Ana, P {DI} =
exp
(− Aa2 na ln n+ O(na)). Therefore, in this case,
P {dAna} 6 exp
[
−
( a
2
− 1+ a
)
Bnβ ln n+ O(nβ)]
which tends to zero for all a > 2/3.
Similarly, we proved for the normal distribution N
(√
(1− δ) ln(Bnβ), 1
)
that for any I ⊆ [n] : |I| = Bnβ , P {DI} =
exp
(
− ε(1−δ)Bβ2 · nβ ln n+ O
(
nβ
))
, where ε = 3−
√
5
2 . Therefore we conclude that:
P {dAna} 6 exp
[
−
(
ε(1− δ)β
2
− 1+ a
)
Bnβ ln n+ O(nβ)]
which tends to zero for all a > 4
7−√5−(3−√5)δ
∼= 0.8396, since δ = Θ( ln ln nln n ) = o(1) (for n→ ∞). Thus we conclude with
the following theorem concerning the support sizes of ESS in a random evolutionary game:
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Theorem 3. Consider an evolutionary game with a random n× n payoff matrix A. Fix arbitrary positive constant ζ > 0.
1. If Aij ∈R U(0, 1),∀(i, j) ∈ [n] × [n], then:
P
{∃ ESS with support size at least n(2+2ζ )/3} 6 exp(−5ζ
6
· n(2+ζ )/3 · ln n+ O(n(2+ζ )/3))→ 0
as n→∞.
2. If Aij ∈R N (ξ , 1) ,∀(i, j) ∈ [n] × [n], where ξ = Θ
(√
ln n
)
, then:
P
{∃ ESS with support size at least n0.8397+ζ } 6 exp (−1.19ζ · n0.8397+ζ/2 · ln n+ O(n0.8397+ζ/2))→ 0
as n→∞.
Remark. Indeed the above theorem upper bounds the unconditional probability of property [H2] being satisfied by any
submatrix of A that is determined by an index set I ⊆ [n] : |I| > n2/3 (for the uniform case) or |I| > n0.8397 (for the
case of the normal distribution). We adopt the particular presentation of the result for purposes of comparison with the
corresponding results of Haigh [5] and Kingman [8].
4. An upper bound on the expected number of ESS
In this last section we combine our result on the probability of property [H2] being satisfied, in random evolutionary
games wrt the normal distribution N (ξ , 1), with the result of McLennan and Berg [11] on the expected number of NE in
random bimatrix games wrt the normal distribution N (0, 1). The goal is to show that ESS in random evolutionary games
are significantly less than SNE in the underlying symmetric bimatrix games.
We start with some additional notation, that will assist the clearer presentation of the argument. Let A, B be random n×n
(payoff) matrices, whose elements behave as independent, normal-random variables: ∀(i, j) ∈ [n]× [n], Aij, Bij ∈R N (ξ , 1).
We denote by:
– Enashn,r : The expected number of NE with support sizes equal to r for both strategies, in 〈A, B〉.
– Esymn,r : The expected number of SNE with support sizes equal to r for both strategies, in 〈A, AT〉.
– Eessn,r : The expected number of ESS of support size r , in the random evolutionary game, with payoff matrix A.
– Establen,r : The expected number of strategieswith support size r that satisfy property [H2], in the randomevolutionary game,
with payoff matrix A.
– Eessn =
∑n
r=1 Eessn,r .
– Esymn =∑nr=1 Esymn,r .
We shall prove now the following theorem:
Theorem 4. If the n× n payoff matrix A of an evolutionary game is randomly chosen so that each of its elements behaves as an
independentN (ξ , 1) random variable, then it holds that Eessn = o
(
Esymn
)
, as n→∞.
Proof. First of all we should mention that the concept of Nash Equilibrium is invariant under affine transformations of the
payoff matrices. Therefore, we may safely assume that the results of [11] on the expected number of NE in n × n bimatrix
games, in which the values of both the payoff matrices are treated as standard normal-random variables, are also valid
if we shift both the payoff matrices by any positive number ξ (or equivalently, if we consider the normal distribution
N (ξ , 1) for the elements of the payoff matrices). The main theorem of the work of McLennan and Berg concerns Enashn,r in
〈A, B〉.1
In our workwe are concerned about Eessn,r , the expected number of ESSwith support size r , in a random evolutionary game
with payoff matrix A. Our purpose is to demonstrate the severity of [H2] (compared to the Nash Property [H1] that must
also hold for an ESS), therefore we shall compare the expected number of SNE in 〈A, AT〉 with the expected number of ESS
in the random evolutionary game with payoff matrix A.
Although themain result of [11] concerns arbitrary (probably asymmetric) normal-randombimatrix games, if one adapts
their calculations for SNE in symmetric bimatrix games, then one can easily observe that similar concentration results hold
for this case as well. The key formula of [11] is the following:
∀1 6 r 6 n, Enashn,r =
(
n
r
)2
· 22−2r · (R(r − 1, n− r))2 (8)
1 It is mentioned that in such a random game, strategy profiles in which the two player do not have the same support sizes, are not NE with probability
asymptotically equal to one. This is why we only focus on profiles in which both players have the same support size r .
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where, R(a, b) = ∫∞−∞ φg(x) · (Φg ( x√a+1))b is the probability of e0 getting a value greater than√a+ 1 than the maximum
value among e1, . . . , eb, where e0, e1, . . . , eb ∈R N (0, 1). For the case of a random symmetric bimatrix game 〈A, AT〉, the
proper shape of the formula for SNE in 〈A, AT〉 is the following:
∀1 6 r 6 n, Esymn,r =
(
n
r
)
· 21−r · (R(r − 1, n− r)) . (9)
As for the asymptotic result that the support sizes r of NE are sharply concentrated around 0.316n, this is also valid for SNE
in symmetric games. The only difference is that as one increases n by one, the expected number of NE in the symmetric
game goes up, not by an asymptotic factor of exp(0.2816) ≈ 1.3252, but rather by its square root exp(0.1408) ≈ 1.1512.
So, we can state this extension of the McLennan–Berg result as follows: There exists a constant β ≈ 0.316, such that for any
ε > 0, it holds (as n→∞) that
d(1+ε)βne∑
r=b(1−ε)βnc
Esymn,r > εE
sym
n .
From this we can easily deduce that
b(1−ε)βnc−1∑
r=1
Esymn,r 6 (1− ε)Esymn .
It is now rather simple to observe that for any 1 6 Z 6 n:
Eessn ≡
n∑
r=1
Eessn,r =
Z∑
r=1
Eessn,r +
n∑
r=Z+1
Eessn,r
6
Z∑
r=1
Esymn,r +
n∑
r=Z+1
Establen,r
since ess = stable ∧ sym. If we set Z = n0.8397+ζ for some ζ > 0, then:
Z∑
r=1
Esymn,r 6
n−0.1603+ζ
β
Esymn
n∑
r=Z+1
Establen,r 6
n∑
r=Z+1
Eessn · P {∃ ESS with support > r}
<
n∑
Z=r+1
Esymn · P {∃ ESS with support > r}
< Esymn · exp
(
log n− 1.19ζ · n0.8397+ζ/2 · ln n+ O(n0.8397+ζ/2)) .
Therefore, we conclude that Eessn = O
(
n−0.16 · Esymn
) = o(Esymn ). 
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